One people, God, flag

We will be one people
under one God
saluting one American flag!

(Donald Trump, repeatedly, deliberately, emphatically)

Responses con:

  • it’s at odds with the American promise of religious freedom (Sarah McCammon of NPR)
  • one of the great strengths of this country is the diversity of nationalities, of origins – the differences of opinions about religion, and ideas about religion (Barry Lynn, Americans United for Separation of Church and State)
  • this makes it seem like he, as the President of the United States, could somehow bring us together by converting us all and making sure we salute the same flag (Barry Lynn)
  • it adds to this overall ominous tone that America is going to become about certain types of people first, and everybody else maybe not so much part of the American pie anymore (Corey Saylor, Council on American-Islamic Relations)
  • One God’ immediately excludes Hindus, atheists, Native Americans – whole swaths of people who have a right to be part of the American identity,” he said. “And under what we’ve established in this country — the notion that you can have multiple faiths and all still share the same ideal of being American — the campaign is once again just really lopping off support from minorities (Corey Saylor)

Responses pro:

  • I think what Donald Trump was getting at with that comment is this disrespect that people of faith — people who are patriotic Americans, who have served in the military, whose children serve in the military — are feeling right now from the elites in this country, and particularly from some of the institutions (Penny Nance, Concerned Women for America)
  • What we hear [from Trump] is a call for unity, a call for really understanding that we are a nation under God,” Nance said. “And although as Americans we maybe experience that differently, we see that as essential to our success — as individuals and as a people (Penny Nance)

(NPR)

Notice anything missing?

We can’t even say “First Amendment” or “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” any more. We resort to dubious diversity clichés instead, or predictions of political fallout.

And I confess that when I heard Penny Nance of Concerned Women for America (“We are the nation’s largest public policy women’s organization with a rich history of over three decades of helping our members across the country bring Biblical principles into all levels of public policy.“) turn God into “essential to our success,” I said a very vulgar epithet, quite loudly, within hearing of the cabin of my car — which is of tender years, not yet even seven years old. (But it’s a Volkswagen Diesel, so it’s already sneaking out to smoke.)

Well: so much for any hope that The Donald would be the restorer of civil society in general and subsidiarity in particular. Sounds like Übernationalism to me.

* * * * *

“In learning as in traveling and, of course, in lovemaking, all the charm lies in not coming too quickly to the point, but in meandering around for a while.” (Eva Brann)

Some succinct standing advice on recurring themes.

What is the essence of conservatism in America?

There is an outstanding “reprint” at the Imaginative Conservative, Mark C. Henrie’s The Conservative Reformation. You could do worse than chew on it for an hour or two.

Isn’t imaginative conservatism an oxymoron? Glad you asked!

Contrary to popular belief, conservatism always requires creativity, for it only arises when customs are already under attack and can thus no longer be maintained unself­consciously.

(All block quotes except as indicated are from Henrie)

Henrie begins with the need for reformation.

Two decades ago, George Nash, in his The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945, told the story of how American conservatism was forged rather uneasily as a political movement from three intellectual groupings: traditionalists, lib­ertarians, and anti-communists. Today [apparently, the early 1990s] on the conventional “Right,” however, we find many libertarians who argue as vigorously against the opponents of abortion as they do against economic central planners while we also find some religious traditionalists who see no particularly compelling reason not to support fairly activist regulation of both economic and social life. These dis­agreements are nothing new, of course, and, as conservatives are nothing if they are not historically informed, it would be wise to return to Nash’s book to learn from the older disputes which took place on the way to political victory in the 1980s.

A re-reading of Nash’s book raises a more important question: Was there a logic to American conservatism, or was the move­ment merely a marriage of political conve­nience? My belief is that there was and is a general logic to conservatism, to which Ameri­can conservatism is no exception; but this conservative logic has heretofore often been misunderstood in America. Thus, our central theoretical question is: What is, and should be, the essence of conservatism in America? If we can determine the nature of authentic conser­vatism, then perhaps we can come to under­stand better the political and social challenges that confront us in our new historical circum­stances. What will conservatism have to say to America in the 1990s and beyond?

(Emphasis added)

With Communism out of the way as a common enemy, what counts as true conservatism’s common friend? (If we must unite against a common enemy again, I’m outta here.)

To answer this, we must try to understand what it was about communism that galvanized us against it. The Soviet communists claimed the mantle of the French Revolution of course, the first incar­nation of the conservatives’ perennially re­curring adversary. What is it then that con­servatives have repeatedly opposed for the past two centuries?

… [T]he only consistent theme in European conservative thought, both in England and on the continent, is opposition to … that claim by the centralized, “rationalized,” and liberal democratic political state to a monopoly on the “legitimate” use of coercion, a claim which expanded imperceptibly to a tacitly presumed monopoly of social authority … This presumptuous expansion of the sphere of the political sovereign acted to delegitimize other social authorities and inter­mediate institutions to which conservatives felt themselves bound, and which conser­vatives believed were integral to a good life.

(Emphasis added) Here enters civil society as a common denominator of conservatism. But how does the state threaten civil society?

What is centrally important about this rise of sovereignty is that it proceeded in large part through theories of natural rights and the social contract: Individual liberties, therefore, have only abetted the growth of Leviathan. Robert Nisbet highlights this hidden dynamic in the best short study of conservatism in English, Conservatism: Dream and Reality. Nisbet observes what would seem to Americans to be an historical paradox: The power of the state in our lives has risen hand in hand with the rise of the individual “rights” about which we are so proud … Nisbet argues that these two movements—increasing political power and increasing individual “freedom”—are directly related. For the rights that have been “recognized” by the modern liberal state are not so much rights against the state as they are rights against other social bodies that used to have some mea­sure of authority in the lives of men and women.

Nisbet traces the rise of the sovereign liberal state at the expense of the Church, the guilds, universities, social classes, the extended family, and now at long last, even the nuclear family—everything except “the individual.”

(Emphasis added)

The attack on the institutions of civil society is far more pernicious today than when Henrie wrote.

First, it seemingly has become a Democrat party cliché that “Government is simply the name we give to the things we choose to do together,” but the cliché is obviously a half-truth, for we do many other things together, too. Or maybe the Democrats have in mind Government being the only thing we do together, or homogenizing civil society to where it’s no more that the ladies’ auxiliary to government.

But we have far worse to fear that subversive cliché. The latest of which I’m aware doesn’t even come from government, but from neo-McCarthyite homophiles seeking to enlist the aid of big business to crush colleges and universities that resist (by asking for Title IX waivers or allowing free speech) homogeneously diversifying:

The business case for equality is clear. If companies take pride in “being inclusive and welcoming to all” and say that “discrimination is wrong,” these same corporations must consider their associations with these 102 anti-LGBTQ campuses. Discrimination under the guise of religion is still discrimination. It is the most oppressive and hurtful kind of bias and prejudice to LGBTQ people, who have been victimized by religion-based bigotry for many years.

… Don’t donate to these campuses. Don’t recruit or hire at these colleges. Simply choose not to do business with those who choose discrimination over inclusion and diversity.

Thus did Shane Windmeyer, M.S., ED., McCarthyite creep, call for discrimination over inclusion and diversity while accusing others of doing so. Seriously: what kind of idiotic LGBT jackbootery will it take before corporate America realizes qui cum canibus concumbunt cum pulicibus surgent?

Before that, it was Iowa and Massachusetts Civil Rights Commissions beginning the progressive campaign to refashion “deep-seated cultural codes, religious beliefs and structural biases” by making Churches into public accommodations subject to our new raft of gender-bending pseudo-laws, rooted in nothing more substantial than a “Dear Colleague” letter from Washington. The Iowa and Massachusetts bureaucrats won’t say exactly what they mean, but one possible example would be be refusing to call Trans Jack by his preferred name of “Suzy” at evangelistic spaghetti dinner.

When the state comes around offering you more rights, you can safely wager a large amount of money that it’s offering a zero-sum game at the expense of someone other than the state.

If con­servatives wish to remain true to their his­torical concerns, they should recognize as their adversary the Universal and Homoge­neous State.

Even the pretense that we’re free is tacitly abandoned:

The homogenizing power of liberal mar­ket logic is revealed in contemporary politi­cal arguments that speak of the necessity of “competitiveness” in international markets. While it is often claimed that modern tech­nological production has freed humanity from nature or necessity, the unrestrained market has itself become the realm of neces­sity that cannot be opposed.Here, it is con­tended that we are not free to resist the demands of market efficiency. We are not free to seek such social goods as higher environmental standards. We are not free to defend settled ways of life by protecting older domestic industries. Owing to lower real wage levels brought on by a competitive labor market, women are not free to remain at home as mothers, regardless of the non-quantifiable harm to children. In short, we are not free to organize any of our social relations in a manner that will lead to pro­duction inefficiencies. Indeed, the free trade agreements of the last decade which seek to eliminate “non-tariff barriers to trade” aim to establish supra-state mechanisms that will prevent nations from freely choosing for any reason any path for their society that conflicts with the demands of the market; all peoples will be subjected to the “necessi­ties” of efficient market competition. How ironic that the liberal partisans of individual “freedom” have led us to a situation where the demands of the market itself preempt or obscure free choice.

Henrie did not fully anticipate the totalizing role of American Corporate power when he wrote, not of giant corporations, but of “the market economy.”

Most controver­sially to American conservatives, we can begin to see here that what is at issue in our confrontation with modernity is not state authority, considered an evil, against the freedom of the market, considered a good. What Kojève understood, what the older and especially the Continental conserva­tives understood, and what American con­servatives in the 1990s must come to under­stand, is that the liberal state is a cooperative venture between a certain form of political association (democracy) and a certain form of economic association (the market economy)—both founded on an atomized and atomizing individualism. Together, these act to “rationalize” society and per­sons in society. In this analysis, the market is not experienced positively as a realm of unique freedom, but instead is experienced as a realm where uniform laws of rational efficiency act to the end of homogenization and therefore dehumanization. Human goods such as community, solidarity, and indeed, even eccentricity, which are threat­ened in the process of homogenization, are what conservatives ultimately must be about “conserving.”

As demonstrated by the bullying of Indiana during its RFRA adventures and now North Carolina for politically incorrect toilet laws, corporations are a huge enemy of freedom.

So what do we do about this?

Also at the formal level of political life, conservatives should continue their critical attention to rights-discourse. For as we have seen, this is the lever by which the sover­eignty of the liberal state has progressed at the expense of the various intermediate as­sociations. There are good arguments to be made for abandoning or at least severely curtailing our use of “rights-talk.” Still, if Americans must speak in this idiom, at least for the time being, conservatives should make it their primary aim to investigate and elaborate upon the one right that is most often neglected in American political thought: the freedom of association. In legal philosophy today, this subject largely remains terra incognita, yet it may provide the first key for conservatives to roll back the homogeneous state.

Henrie proposed a possible antidote to excessive corporate power, though he saw the problem of corporate power being somewhat different than what actually has shaped up:

… Southern Agrarians might suggest how a creative logic of resistance against homog­enization can be extended into the world of business. The Agrarians believed that pri­vate property was good because of the sense of independence and responsibility it elic­ited from persons who owned property. But corporate or “abstract” property-ownership does not seem to have this effect. Thus, one conservative reform might be a reconsid­eration of the legal status of the limited liability corporation, which systematically biases the economy in favor of large and impersonal corporate property over propri­etary business concerns. Such a scheme might well be less efficient at the production of material goods, but its effect would also be profoundly humanizing. Are we willing to pay such a price?

This last question is crucial, for seeking changes in public policy so that a humane associational life may flourish will come to naught if we do not ourselves seek in our own local contexts to “live well” together, to build a common life within our families and with our neighbors that might be strong enough to resist homogenization. This may require some sacrifices; it will require us to say “no” to some of the temptations of the market and the state. Yet only if our fami­lies, churches, and other associations mean something to us, indeed become part of us, will a defense of them in public policy be plausible. Living “conservatively”—living generously within our concrete contexts—always has priority over any political or ideological project.

* * * * *

“In learning as in traveling and, of course, in lovemaking, all the charm lies in not coming too quickly to the point, but in meandering around for a while.” (Eva Brann)

Some succinct standing advice on recurring themes.

Saturday 9/17/16

  1. A More Perfect Absolutism
  2. Why nobody trusts Hillary
  3. Elitist fat-cat inversion
  4. Trump’s smartest unconstitutional proposal
  5. No tar, feathers, or quality control

Continue reading “Saturday 9/17/16”

Putin, Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy

Sometimes one might think this upcoming election is between Hillary Clinton and Vladimir Putin, since Donald Trump has not concealed a measure of admiration for Putin and Hillary’s fans (including the press) have tried to hang Putin, like an albatross, on Trump.

Michael Brendan Dougherty, in irenic non-albatross mode, offers A field guide to Republicans’ tangled relationship with Vladimir Putin. Excerpt:

Russia hawks: …

The shallow anti-Obama partisans: …

The nervous realists and Russophiles: Realists and Russophiles deplore Putin’s rule, but claim to understand it. For them Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and the Middle East — even its authoritarianism — can be explained by the country’s history and geography. Land and resource empires tend not to be liberal, especially when pressed up so close to potentially powerful rivals like China, Japan, Germany, or threats like Turkey. This group tends to emphasize that Russia lost a lot of territory, access to resources, and power after the Cold War. They disagree with the shallow partisans about Russia’s strength; they see Russia becoming more desperate, not strong, over the last decade. And their fear is that the West will blunder into open hostilities by insisting on something that is of trivial interest to the West, but of vital interest to Russia. Some nervous realists opposed NATO’s post-Cold War expansion. Some regret it going beyond Poland. Many of them believe that Russia should be a useful ally against Islamic extremism. They tend to think the West was overreaching in its support of protesters in Ukraine. I would include myself in the group of nervous realists, along with the British writer Peter Hitchens.

Western Putinists: At the very hard end you will find a subset of people on the nationalist right who believe the U.S.-led liberal world order is irredeemably corrupt and corrosive of Western civilization … Sometimes Western Putinists come in a softer appearance, merely being fans of a state that publicly champions religion …

Most of the professional foreign policy debate is had between the hawks and the realists on Russia, while the other two camps are seen as irrelevant, or just crankish. But part of what people find so unnerving about Trump is that while he is not at all ideological or politically savvy, he seems to instinctively incline towards the view of the Putinists, admiring Putin precisely for his brutality and strength, and disdaining America and Europe’s liberality as a weakness. Western Putinism may not be irrelevant after all.

I, too, am among the Nervous Realists and Russophiles.

I understand that Putin is rebuilding a venerable nation in which civil society was systematically destroyed for some 70 years. Yes, Putin had a hand in that, though “KGB” wasn’t the worst of the Soviet apparatus:

Its main functions were foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, operative-investigatory activities, guarding the State Border of the USSR, guarding the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, organization and ensuring of government communications as well as combating nationalism, dissent, and anti-Soviet activities.

(Wikipedia) According to Economist Espresso today, though,

Civil society (or what’s left of it) is feeling the squeeze [from Putin] too. The prosecutor’s office is investigating Memorial, on of Russia’s most storied human-rights groups, as a “foreign agent”. The Levada Centre, the country’s only remaining independent pollster, has been declared one, too ….

Any sensible person will recognize that Memorial and the Levada Centre might indeed be foreign agents — Economist’s use of scare-quotes isn’t reassuring of neutrality — and likewise that they might merely be threats to Putin.

Russian national health is not yet restored, Russian Orthodox identity tends to be of the even-our-atheists-are-Orthodox variety — part of national identity as much or more than a personally meaningful religion. There are tens of millions of pious exceptions to that broad-brush characterization, though.

Thus I know too much about what’s going on inside Russia to fully credit Putin’s promotion of religion — even if it’s my own Christian tradition he’s putatively pushing.

The New York Times wrote at length Wednesday on how Putin is using the Church to extend Russian influence into Western Europe and to position Russia as the last bastion of Christian society in a decadent world. I do not doubt that Putin’s motives are at best mixed, and possibly nothing but political.

Rod Dreher, also Orthodox, found that Putin’s positioning may be working:

On the other hand, as Western societies disintegrate under aggressive secularism, individualism, materialism, and hedonism, it’s hard as a traditional Christian not to sympathize with the general thrust of what Russia is doing, if not in certain particulars. When I was in Italy in the summer of 2015, I was surprised to have a couple of conversations with practicing Catholics who, when learning that I am an Orthodox Christian, assumed that I approve of Putin, and began praising him and the Russian Orthodox Church for its strong voice for traditional Christian morality. I was genuinely surprised to hear this from them, but I understand where they’re coming from. They see their own society drifting far from the faith, and the Catholic Church unable to halt the slide, and often unwilling to lift a finger to try. Put another way, they see Putin, for all his flaws, trying to protect his country from sliding into the moral and cultural abyss.

Again, I think it’s a devil’s bargain for the Church, but at the same time, I grudgingly admire Putin’s unwillingness to capitulate in the face of the worst aspects of Western liberalism. The fact that Orthodoxy is “ultraconservative and anti-modern” is a feature, not a bug — but to be clear, its conservatism is not the sort that would find much favor in the GOP.

(Bold added)

I agree with Rod with a caveat: I do hope that Orthodoxy doesn’t suffer an influx of ultraconservative anti-modernists who really have no interest in Christ. I steer clear of politics at Church precisely because it has the potential for disruption of what the Church is really about.

I have met or read some American converts to Orthodoxy who seem at least notionally Putinist if not Tsarist. In some cases, it appears a blemish on an otherwise pious and sensible life. In others, I’ve got to wonder (because I’m a sinner who can’t keep his imagination out of other people’s business) whether Orthodoxy isn’t subordinate to authoritarianism.

* * * * *

Russia aside:

2.) How should we understand the beauty of Orthodox spirituality from your point of view?

Fr. Anthony: It is the way I always had hoped faith would be. Not emotional or manipulative but respective of free will while at the same time holding people to a high standard. Plus the beauty and insight about what it means to be a person. The theology of salvation is beautiful. The Liturgy and the Eucharist are at the center of our faith and the art and architecture are profound.

(From Glory to Glory: The Journey of Fr. Anthony Salzman)

* * * * *

“In learning as in traveling and, of course, in lovemaking, all the charm lies in not coming too quickly to the point, but in meandering around for a while.” (Eva Brann)

Some succinct standing advice on recurring themes.

Wednesday 9/14/16

  1. Journalistic credulity at its finest
  2. Putin is under every bed and in every closet
  3. Like a geriatric Soviet premier
  4. Election violence update
  5. Stronger Together Without the Deplorables
  6. Spreading disinformation
  7. Disneyfied Gumbo
  8. Naked Emperors

Continue reading “Wednesday 9/14/16”