Holman Jenkins at the Wall Street Journal rises to the defense of Goldman Sachs, and this time it’s not half-hearted. (You knew someone would, didn’t you? Some people are just contrary.)

Make no mistake: The gestalt behind the SEC case is that short selling is bad. Constructing deals to enable short sellers to bet against certain markets (as Goldman did) is bad. When longs lose money because of freely chosen participation in such trades, it’s bad. When shorts make money, it’s bad …

Remember, the long investors could have bought mortgages directly if they wanted to invest in housing. They wanted the more attractive premium stream from insuring mortgages for an investor who was betting they would fail. And only in hindsight has Mr. Paulson become the mastermind who made billions betting against what now is judged to have been a bubble.

Of course, you can’t go wrong betting on the media’s unwillingness to unwrap itself from the errors of hindsight bias—that bet by the SEC has paid off. But there are bigger fish being fried. For more than a year, certain knowledgeable bloggers and investigative reporters have argued that such deals—Goldman’s was hardly unique—exacerbated the bubble, with special focus on the activities of a Chicago hedge fund called Magnetar.

It’s true that such deals gave housing bulls an additional way to lose money. But to blame shorts for making the bubble worse comes close to saying salvation for the markets is to exclude participants who are bearish.

This is especially peculiar since the bubble’s true Rosetta Stone is being ignored, though it has been hammered away at by a member of Washington’s own Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in the person of Peter Wallison.

Mr. Wallison has publicized new data showing that Fannie, Freddie and FHA financed a lot more subprime and Alt-A loans than anyone realized (because they were mislabeled). It turns out almost half of the $10.6 trillion in U.S. mortgages outstanding in 2008 were low quality. This is the data that might have changed investors’ minds—suggesting that the American public’s capacity to shoulder housing debt was far more saturated than anybody knew.

I don’t think any account of the housing bubble collapse is even near complete without factoring in the role of the federal government and its creations, Fannie, Freddie and FHA, in encouraging subprime mortgages to make homeowners of more people. That is turn is driven by lobbyists from the real estate industry. It is part of the crony capitalism I blogged about yesterday.

Is it evil to want to empower people to own their homes? No. Is it fraught with unforeseen consequences? You bet.

(Full disclosure: I’m a sucker for writers who use “gestalt.”)

Meanwhile, out of the mainstream, a Distributist economist, John Médaille, invokes Aristotle and Aquinas as worthy bank regulators:

Not too long ago, a Prominent Economist told me that Aristotle had nothing to teach us about modern finance. I beg to differ; Aristotle, and the Scholastics who adopted his approach to economics, were surprisingly sophisticated on these topics, while so many Prominent Economists are surprisingly naïve. Indeed, Aristotle left us a principle of commerce that serves very well as a principle of regulation. This principle is the distinction he makes between natural and unnatural exchange. Modern commentators, who make no distinctions, have viewed this as a mere primitive hostility to business; actually, it was a shrewd appreciation of commerce. For Aristotle, natural exchange was that which was necessary for the provisioning of the family (the true meaning of economics.) Unnatural exchange that which had only money as it object.

The former is “natural” because it limits itself; that later unnatural because is has no natural limits. For example, a man wishing to buy bread for his family will buy only as much as he needs; this is a natural exchange. But a man wishing only to make money in the bread biz may wish to buy up all the bread and corner the market so as to raise prices and make a fortune on others’ necessities; this is an unnatural exchange. When applied to finance, a transaction is natural when it is when it is firmly and directly tied to the production of some actual product; it is unnatural the more abstract and derivative it becomes, and when its only object is to make money rather than profit from production. Thus, we may say that banks directly financing home purchases or construction are natural transactions, and less natural when they become “securitized,” bundled together and sold in packages to remote investors who will have no contact with the actual homes, banks, or borrowers. The situation becomes even more abstract when you speak of securitizing the securities (“CDO-Squared” or even “CDO-Cubed”) or with CDSs, which become pure speculative bets on the market. The more abstract the instrument, the more closely it should be scrutinized.

As things now stand, we have reversed Aristotle’s order: the natural exchanges are highly regulated, while the unnatural ones are often unregulated. In more normal times, when you went to George Bailey to get a mortgage, he squinted at you real hard to see if you are the kind of person who will pay him back for 30 years. George needs little oversight to encourage him to be prudent, since he has the bank’s capital and the depositors’ money at risk. But if George merely intends to securitize the loan, then he merely glances at you to see if you are the kind of person who will pay for two weeks, because after that you are somebody else’s problem.

(Full disclosure: (1) Tipsy is intoxicated by Distributism, a “third way” economic theory, like wine to the head of a teetotaler  – see masthead. (2) Tipsy is part owner of a title insurance company that was formed partly because mortgage loans were routinely being sold out of the community, and consequently old-fashioned county-seat-lawyer abstract opinions weren’t worth jack any more.)